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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and main findings
Labor market shocks can have a large and long-lasting impact on people’s careers
and lives. Consider a plant closing down in the middle of a recession. The subsequent
job loss for individual workers can have severe effects, even though these workers
lost their job beyond their own fault. While many people are able to find a new
job relatively quickly, for some it can lead to prolonged periods of unemployment,
permanently lower wages and consumption (Jacobson et al., 1993) and worse health
(Rege et al., 2009). Some research even finds that following a job loss, workers
experience an increase in mortality (Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009) and their
children perform worse in school (Rege et al., 2011).
Labor market shocks can have many different causes, several of which are explored
in this dissertation. An important cause of shocks to workers are structural changes in
the economy, such as globalization (Autor et al., 2014) or technological change. Going
as far back as the industrial revolution, people have worried about how technology
impacts the labor market and replaces some workers. Recently, the development of
robots and artifical intelligence has sparked renewed interest in this question (Autor,
2015; Autor and Salomons, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2018d).
Chapter 2 examines how recent automation technology, such as robots and AI,
impacts individual workers.1 In this chapter we provide the first micro-level empirical
evidence of the effect of automation on a range of worker-level outcomes, including
the probability to leave the automating firm, wage income, benefit receipt and
self-employment. We observe how much firms spend on automation and identify
1This chapter is joint work with James Bessen, Maarten Goos and Anna Salomons. It is based
on Bessen et al. (2019).
large increases in these costs as automation events. We then exploit the differences
in timing in these events between firms in a differences-in-differences design. We
find that for incumbent workers (defined as those with a firm tenure of at least three
years) automation at the firm increases the probability to separate from the firm.
Firm separation is followed by an increase in time spent in unemployment. Due to
the increased incidence of unemployment, workers experience on average a decline in
cumulative wage income of around 11% of yearly earnings after five years. We do
not find evidence of wage scarring. We find that these earnings losses are pervasive
across firm and worker types and only partially offset by benefit systems. Finally,
we compare automation events to computerization events, and find no such losses
when firms invest heavily in computers.
We contribute to the existing literature with our direct measure of automation
at the firm level, which allows us to study the worker impacts of automation where
they originate. Second, we develop and implement a methodology exploiting the
timing of firm-level automation events for identifying causal effects. Third, we
consider automation events across all private non-financial sectors, whereas the
existing literature generally only considers a specific automation technology. Fourth,
we examine a wide array of worker level outcomes. Finally, we directly compare the
current worker-level impacts of automation to those of computerization.
Another important cause of labor market shocks to individual workers is the
business cycle, such as when a plant closes down in a recession (Jacobson et al., 1993).
Similarly, young workers who enter the labor market in a recession are generally
worse off than those who enter in good times (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Chapter 3
examines the consequences of this shock for Dutch high educated graduates who enter
the labor market in a recession between 1996 and 2012.2 The chapter contributes to
the existing literature by examining the effects of graduating in a recession separately
for academic and vocational graduates and to consider in detail how job mobility
contributes to catching up by looking at how young workers climb the job ladder.
I find that academic graduates suffer strong initial wage effects of 10% for
each percentage point decline (around half of a standard deviation) in field-specific
employment at graduation. The wage losses gradually decline until they fade out
after about five years on the labor market. The initial wage losses for vocational
graduates are significantly smaller at close to 6% for each percentage point decline
in field-specific employment at graduation. They remain significantly smaller than
for university graduates in the first four years. However, wage losses for vocational
2This chapter is single authored. It is published as Van den Berge (2018).
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graduates remain persistent at about 1% up to at least 8 years after graduation.
Employment probabilities for both academic and vocational graduates are negatively
affected in the first three to four years on the labor market. While self-employment
is not affected for vocational graduates, for academic graduates I find evidence of
graduates temporarily substituting regular employment for self-employment in the
first years after graduation.
I show that job mobility plays a critical role in recovering from initial wage losses
for both academic and vocational graduates who start in a recession. Both groups
are more likely to switch firms and sectors, and when they do switch, they gain more
than their counterparts who started in a boom. Graduates are more likely to start
in firms that pay lower wages in a recession and gradually move to higher paying
firms. Both are also more likely to be mismatched in their early career. Interestingly,
while switching sectors solves the initial mismatch for academic graduates, vocational
graduates remain in sectors that are not typical for their field of study. This could
explain the persistent wage losses for vocational graduates.
Institutions and policy can also cause shocks to people’s labor market position.
Chapter 4 considers how parents adjust their behavior on the labor market to their
youngest child going to primary school.3 Primary school, in addition to teaching
children, also functions as both free and compulsory childcare. This is different
from most other childcare arrangements studied in the literature, which are often
inexpensive or even free, but are not compulsory. We build a theoretical model that
shows that the youngest child going to school might have two effects on parental
working hours. First, parents who used to take care of their children during school
hours experience an increase in free time available and are hence expected to increase
their working hours. Second, parents whose children attended paid childcare before
going to school might decrease their working hours when their youngest child starts
school, because they save on childcare expenses.
Empirically we find significant differences in the responses between men and
women. Dutch mothers on average experience an increase in available time of thirteen
hours a week when their youngest child goes to school, yet the average number of
hours worked per week increases by 0.5 hours after two years. This is an increase of
around 3% relative to their mean hours worked. Dutch fathers, who usually already
worked full-time, also show a small increase in hours worked of about 0.3 hours, or
0.8% relative to the mean.
3This chapter is joint work with Lisette Swart and Karen van der Wiel. It is based on Swart
et al. (2019).
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We contribute to the existing literature on compulsory schooling and parental
labor supply by examining effects both for mothers and fathers. Furthermore, our
unique dataset allows us to precisely estimate the effects of compulsory schooling on
labor supply. We observe recent cohorts of parents for each month surrounding their
youngest child going to school. Finally, the Dutch institutional setting allows us to
clearly disentangle the effect of school-going from seasonal effects.
Policy makers are often reluctant or unable to directly intervene in the market
processes and choices that can lead to labor market shocks, even if they have negative
consequences for some workers. For example, limiting technological progress might
help some workers keep their job, but would hamper economic growth. Instead, the
policy response often consists in compensating the workers hurt by these shocks,
such as through unemployment benefits. This is of course only a temporary answer.
Workers who lose their job due to new technology often require new skills to be able
find new work. This could be addressed by investing in training. However, it is
unclear what the right policy instrument is to promote training. The literature shows
that a direct financial instrument, such as a schooling voucher, increases training,
but at the cost of a substantial dead weight loss (Schwerdt et al., 2012; Hidalgo
et al., 2014). Chapter 5 examines whether a tax subsidy available to all workers
instead provides a good incentive for people to invest in training.4
Workers in the Netherlands are allowed to deduct training expenses for lifelong
learning at their marginal tax rate. To estimate the effect of this deduction on
training, we exploit two jumps in the marginal tax rate. These jumps create
exogenous variation in the effective costs of lifelong learning for people with very
similar income levels. For singles we find heterogeneous effects. For low-income
singles we find no effect of the lower costs of lifelong learning due to the jump in
the marginal tax rate. However, for high-income singles we find a 10% increase in
the probability to file lifelong learning expenditures. We find that these effects are
primarily driven by higher-educated middle-aged males. For couples we find small
effects for primary earners and no effects for secondary earners.
Chapter 5 builds on the analysis in an earlier paper by Leuven and Oosterbeek
(2012), but makes substantial improvements. First, we use more detailed and higher
quality data, which allows us to more precisely estimate the effects. Second, we take
into account different effects for singles and couples, which turns out to be important
for the results. Third, we use a regression-kink design for singles, which is more
4This chapter is joint work with Egbert Jongen and Karen van der Wiel. It is based on Van
den Berge et al. (2017).
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appropriate given the data than the regression-discontinuity design in Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2012). Finally, for couples we observe the amount deducted by both
partners before and after shifting the deductibles. We show that ignoring this shifting
behavior can lead to large spurious estimates for both primary and secondary earners.
We also contribute to the literature on financial incentives for lifelong learning, which
typically examines direct subsidies rather than tax incentives.
In my dissertation I make extensive use of two important methodological
developments. First, the increasing availability of large, high quality administrative
data sets covering the entire population. I sometimes combine them with survey
data to answer questions that cannot be answered with just administrative or survey
data alone. Second, the development of tools to answer causal questions using
observational data (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). In this dissertation differences-
in-differences and regression discontinuity are applied. Differences-in-differences
compares a treatment and control group over time. It relies on the assumption that,
while there could be differences between the two groups, the differences do not change
over time: both groups would follow a similar trend in the absence of treatment. In
this thesis matching of the treatment and control group on observed characteristics is
generally applied to ensure that the two groups are as comparable as possible before
the treatment. This method is applied in chapters 3 and 4. Regression discontinuity,
on the other hand relies on a sharp cutoff in a running variable, such as income or
age, that determines whether people are treated or not. This allows a comparison of
people just below this cut-off, who are not treated, with people just above the cut-off,
who are treated. The assumption for a causal interpretation of this comparison is
that all other characteristics, including unobserved characteristics, do not change
discontinouosly at the cutoff. This method is applied in chapter 5.
In sum, this dissertation explores how workers adjust to three different labor
market shocks. Chapter 2 examines how automation affects individual workers.
Chapter 3 explores how young workers adjust to entering the labor market in a
recession. Chapter 4 considers how parents adjust their working hours to their
youngest child going to school. Finally, chapter 5 examines the effectiveness of
one policy which might help workers adjust to shocks: a tax subsidiy for training
investments aimed at stimulating workers to learn new skills. Chapter 6 concludes
with a short summary of the main findings.
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CHAPTER 2
Bad Start, Bad Match? The Early
Career Effects of Graduating in a
Recession for Vocational and
Academic Graduates∗
2.1 Introduction
Youth unemployment is a cause for concern in many countries. Especially during
the Great Recession, when youth unemployment rates rose quickly in many OECD
countries, there have been widespread worries about unemployment disrupting young
people’s lives and giving them a false start on the labor market. While short-term
negative effects of entering the labor market in a recession are to be expected, some
worry that young people will suffer long-lasting negative effects. If true, this type
of hysteresis could lead to a lost generation of young workers who will be stuck in
mismatches and low-paying jobs.
In this paper I consider the effects of labor market conditions at the moment of
graduation on the early careers of tertiary educated graduates in the Netherlands.1
Throughout the paper I examine the effects separately for graduates from universities,
who take an academic track, and graduates from universities of applied science, who
∗This chapter has been published as Van den Berge (2018).
1I examine graduates with degrees in ISCED categories 6 and 7. See section 2.2.3 for more
detail.
take a more vocationally oriented track. In terms of flexibility, the Dutch labor
market is somewhere in between the very flexible labor markets in the US and
the UK and the stringent labor markets of many other European countries. I use
administrative matched employer-employee data on graduates from 1996 to 2012.
My data allow me to follow graduates on the labor market for up to eight years
after graduation. I employ a measure of field-specific employment conditions at
graduation. This best approximates the labor market conditions that high-educated
graduates face.2
The paper addresses two questions. First, does graduating in a recession affect
graduates from the academic and vocational tracks in higher education differently?
I consider effects on wages, but also on employment, self-employment and whether
graduates are dependent on benefits. Second, how do vocational and academic
graduates catch up to their peers who started in good times? I look at the quality
of firms workers start at and consider how they recover through job mobility by
looking at whether workers climb the job ladder and estimating the wage returns to
job mobility.
With respect to the first question I find that academic graduates suffer strong
initital wage effects of 10% for each percentage point decline (around half of a
standard deviation) in field-specific employment at graduation. The wage losses
gradually decline until they fade out after about five years on the labor market.
The initial wage losses for vocational graduates are significantly smaller at close
to 6% for each percentage point decline in field-specific employment at graduation.
They remain significantly smaller than for university graduates in the first four years.
However, wage losses for vocational graduates remain persistent at about −1% up
to at least 8 years after graduation. Employment probabilities for both academic
and vocational graduates are negatively affected in the first three to four years on
the labor market. While self-employment is not affected for vocational graduates,
for academic graduates I find evidence of graduates substituting regular employment
for self-employment in the first years after graduation. This is not persistent though,
as for later years I find evidence for a reverse substitution of self-employment with
regular employment. Finally, I find virtually no effects on benefit take-up.
On the second question I find that job mobility plays a critical role in recovering
from initial wage losses for both academic and vocational graduates who start in a
2This measure is similar to Beiler (2017). It uses the employment conditions in the sectors that
students with a given field of study usually end up in as the measure of labor market conditions at
graduation.
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recession. They are both more likely to switch firms and sectors, and when they do
switch, they gain more than their counterparts who started in a boom. Graduates
are more likely to start in firms that pay lower wages in a recession and gradually
move to higher paying firms. Both are also more likely to be mismatched in their
early career. Interestingly, while switching sectors solves the initial mismatch for
academic graduates, vocational graduates remain in sectors that are not typical for
their field of study. This could at least partly explain the persistent wage losses for
vocational graduates.
This study relates to two strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature
on the effects of bad starting conditions at graduation on long-term labor market
outcomes. Several papers have found that people who enter the labor market during a
recession indeed suffer lower wages up to ten years or longer (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos
et al., 2012; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014). This suggests that hysteresis might be a
real problem, although more recent papers, covering both Europe and the US, find
smaller losses for university educated graduates that disappear after three to five
years on the labor market (Hershbein, 2012; Altonji et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2016;
Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016; Speer, 2016). While most papers on the US only find lower
wages for labor market entrants who started in a recession, papers looking at less
flexible labor markets such as Belgium, Spain or Japan also find higher probabilities
of non-employment (Genda et al., 2010; Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016; Fernández-Kranz
and Rodríguez-Planas, 2018). The literature also finds that high-educated workers
generally suffer more in terms of wages, while low-educated workers suffer more in
terms of employment probabilities (Genda et al., 2010; Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016;
Speer, 2016).3
The paper improves on this literature primarily by considering the effects
separately for academic and vocational graduates. While some papers have explored
differences between high and low educated workers (e.g. Oyer, 2006, 2008; Genda
et al., 2010; Speer, 2016; Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016) there is as far as I’m aware no
3There is also a small Dutch literature on this topic. Van Ours (2009) and Fouarge (2009)
show that there are no long-term differences in unemployment rates between cohorts entering the
labor market in the recession of the 1980s and cohorts who entered just before. Erpelinck and
Van Sonsbeek (2012) look at multiple cohorts and find that primarily tertiary educated graduates
from the early 90s suffer long-term negative effects on their wages. Wolbers (2014) uses repeated
cross-sections covering 1993 - 2011 and finds only short-term negative effects of entering the labor
market during a recession on employment and job level. Limitations of this literature are that they
use cross-section data, that they do not know the actual moment of labor market entry and that
they do not take into account possible selection bias due to people adjusting their moment of labor
market entry to the labor market conditions.
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study that examines the differential effects for academic (general) and vocational
graduates.4
The paper also adds to this literature by considering in detail how job mobility
contributes to catching up. Other papers also consider the mechanisms of catching up.
Motivated by a model of task-specific human capital (as in Gibbons and Waldman,
2004) most papers consider the role of the first firm in explaining the initial and
persistent losses (Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014; Liu et al., 2016).
They generally find that the first employer plays an important role in explaining the
losses. Recent papers also highlight the role of mismatch. They find that workers
who start in a recesison are more likely to work in sectors that are not typical for
their field of study (Liu et al., 2016; Altonji et al., 2016). Oreopoulos et al. (2012)
also consider the role of job mobility for Canadian college graduates. They find that
job mobility increases in the first five years on the labor market. Primarily graduates
at the top end of the skill distribution are more likely to switch firms, while those
at the bottom remain stuck at lower quality firms. After the first five years, the
remaining catching up is within the firm. In addition to considering job mobility and
firm quality, this paper is the first to consider how young workers recover through
climbing the job ladder. There is recent evidence that during recessions the quality
of vacancies is lower and that the probability of moving up the job ladder declines
(Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2016; Haltiwanger et al., 2017). This paper confirms
for the Netherlands that workers are indeed more likely to start at lower rungs of
the job ladder in a recession. While most workers recover through job mobility, I do
find some evidence that up to 8 years after graduation workers are more likely to
remain lower on the job ladder.
Finally, my data allow me to take into account selection bias much more
thoroughly than most other papers. A causal effect of the unemployment rate
at graduation on later outcomes is only identified if students do not adjust their
timing of graduation to labor market conditions. I find evidence that students do
seem to adjust their timing. They are more likely to obtain an additional degree if
economic conditions at graduation are bad, and the composition of the graduation
cohort is different in bad economic conditions. I employ an IV strategy that requires
4A somewhat related study by Humburg et al. (2017) does examine the effect of the
unemployment rate at graduation and self-reported “field-specific” skills on the probability of
being unemployed or over-educated. They use a survey on European graduates for 17 countries.
They find that graduates with high field-specific skills are less likely to be unemployed 5 years
after graduation, but they find no interaction between field-specific skills and the unemployment
rate at graduation. However, they also don’t distinguish between vocational and academic tertiary
educated workers.
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detailed data on when students enter higher education and their expected duration
to deal with this problem. Other studies often do not observe the date of entry or
graduation, and impute the year of school leaving using date of birth and expected
school duration.5
Second, the paper relates to the literature on the benefits of vocational versus
general education. Most of this literature has focused on whether vocational education
eases the transition from eduation to the labor market.6 The findings are mixed. Some
studies indeed find that students with vocational education have better employment
outcomes in their early career (Hanushek et al., 2017) but others find no differences
(Fersterer et al., 2008). Studies focusing on the long-run outcomes generally find no
differences between general and vocational tracks (Oosterbeek and Webbink, 2007;
Malamud and Pop-Eleches, 2010; Hall, 2016). I primarily add to this literature by
considering the effects of bad starting conditions on the transition from education
to the labor market for vocational and general educated workers.7 If vocational
education eases the transition from education to work, one might expect that it
also helps with finding a job in a recession. On the other hand, if there are fewer
vacancies, and especially high-quality vacancies, it could be that general skills
are more helpful in finding a job. Another contribution is that this paper looks at
graduates from tertiary education, while the literature is mostly focused on graduates
from (upper-)secondary education.8
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2.2 I present my empirical strategy
and discuss the data. Main results are presented in section 2.3. In section 2.4 I
explore the mechanisms behind the initial wage losses and catching up and section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Empirical strategy and data
I aim to estimate the effects of economic conditions at graduation on later labor
market outcomes of vocational and academic graduates. In this section I first discuss
5Exceptions are Oreopoulos et al. (2012), who present some estimates using the same IV
strategy as I do, but finds no differences, and Kondo (2015), who predicts age of entry by the
highest degree attained, rather than using the actual date of entry into education.
6See Ryan (2001) and Wolter and Ryan (2011) for surveys on this literature.
7Hall (2016) is the only paper who considers the effect of the unemployment rate at graduation
in a robustness analysis and she only examines it for workers who already have at least 10 years of
working experience. She finds no differences between those with more general and those with more
vocational education.
8Some exceptions are Heijke et al. (2003); Verhaest and Baert (2015); Humburg et al. (2017).
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how I calculate a measure to approximate the economic conditions at graduation.
Then I present my empirical model. Finally, I will describe the data, discuss the
construction of important variables and present descriptive statistics.
2.2.1 Economic conditions measure and model
To best approximate the economic conditions at graduation, I exploit the fact that
the field of study students graduate in provides them with the skills that typically
match to a given set of industries (Liu et al., 2016). For example, students graduating
in finance generally have skills that are well suited for working in the financial sector
compared to students graduating in healthcare. As a result, finance graduates have
probably been hit harder in the financial crisis than students graduating in healthcare.
To arrive at a measure of economic conditions for each field of study, I follow Beiler
(2017). I first calculate for each field of study the share of workers holding a degree in
that field in each industry. These shares indicate the importance of each industry for
a field of study. Then I calculate the year-on-year percentage change in employment
for each industry, and use the field of study specific shares as weights to arrive at a
weighted year-on-year employment change for each field of study. The measure is
calculated as follows
ecf =
∑
s
wsf ∗ ∆esc (2.1)
where s indicates sectors of industry, f field of study and c the year of graduation
(cohort). The variable ∆esc is defined as esc−esc−1esc−1 and denotes the year-on-year
(from year c − 1 to year c) percentage change in employment in each sector. The
time-invariant weights for each industry within each field of study are given by wsf .9
The sample used to construct the measure is discussed in section 2.2.5, where I also
present descriptive statistics.10
9The weights sum to one within each field of study.
10In an earlier version of this paper I used a different measure for economic conditions. I calculated
the unemployment rate for all workers with a degree from a field of study using microdata from
the Labour Force Survey. However, this measure is subject to measurement error and endogeneity
issues. Measurement error arises from small sample sizes due to a small number of unemployed
workers in the Labour Force Survey for some fields of study. The current measure is not subject to
this type of measurement error since it uses all workers employed in a sector. Endogeneity results,
as pointed out by a referee, from workers who could be unemployed because they graduated in an
earlier recession. If the effects of graduating in a recession are indeed persistent, this could bias
the unemployment measure. This effect also exists in the current measure, but it is much smaller,
because graduates make up only a small part of the total number of workers in each sector.
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I then use the weighted employment changes for each field of study to estimate
the effects of the economic conditions at graduation on labor market outcomes. I
use the following linear model
Yitcf = α + βexpexpit ∗ ecf + ζXi + δexp + φc + µf + τt + εit, (2.2)
where Y is the outcome variable (wage, employment status or some other labor
market outcome) for individual i observed in year t who graduated in cohort c in
field of study f . I control for a full set of potential experience fixed effects δexp
(with potential experience exp defined as years since graduation), cohort fixed effects
φ, calendar year fixed effects τ and field of study fixed effects µ. Xi is a vector
of time-constant individual control variables: age at graduation and gender. The
coefficients of interest are the βexp’s which describe the change in the experience
profiles caused by a one percentage point change in field-specific employment ecf at
graduation. I allow the effect to differ for each year of potential experience.11 For
example, β0 describes the effect of a one percentage point change in field-specific
employment at graduation in the year of graduation, while β1 describes the same
effect in the first year after graduation. I estimate the effect for the first 8 years
after students obtain a degree, so for exp = 1 until exp = 8.12
I take the year of graduation of a student’s highest degree as their point of entry
into the labor market. The potential experience fixed effects pick up the average
effect of potential experience on the outcome variable. The year fixed effects control
for any variation in labor market conditions and for other year effects that might
affect wages apart from the change in employment at graduation or experience. The
cohort fixed effects pick up changes at the cohort level that might affect labor market
outcomes, such as the increased participation rate in higher education or changes in
student support.13 Finally, field of study fixed effects control for average differences
in the labor market opportunities of students with different fields of study. To take
into account that individuals from the same cohort might have experienced similar
11I have also experimented with more restricted functions for experience, such as a quadratic or
cubic. The results are similar to the more flexible version I use here.
12I observe some cohorts (from 1999 until 2007) more than 8 years, while other cohorts (2009 -
2012 and 1996 - 1998) are observed less than 8 years on the labor market. I always observe at least
4 years for each cohort. Extending the analysis to 10 years yields similar results and does not affect
the main conclusions.
13Since cohort, potential experience and year fixed effects can not be identified at the same time,
I have to impose another restriction. I follow the literature and impose that one additional year
effect is zero (Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016).
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shocks - e.g. changes in the education system - I cluster standard errors at the level
of the graduation cohort and field of study.14
2.2.2 Selection bias
OLS estimates of βexp will be biased if the field-specific change in employment at
graduation is correlated with unobserved variables that also determine the outcome
variable. A potential source of selection bias is that students adjust their timing of
graduation to labor market conditions. Students could postpone graduating during
a recession or students could leave school earlier during a boom if they already found
a job. Students could also pursue an additional degree. To deal with this potential
source of selection bias I employ an IV strategy similar to Oreopoulos et al. (2012).15
As an instrument for the change in the employment rate at graduation I use the
change in the employment rate at the predicted year of graduation using the actual
entry date and the nominal study duration. This is a valid instrument if it is not
related to labor market outcomes, except through the unemployment rate in the
actual year of graduation. The instrument would be invalid if, at entry, students are
able to predict the state of the labor market at their expected graduation date. Given
the difficulty of predicting unemployment rates, this seems a plausible exclusion
restriction.
Another way to think of the difference between the OLS and IV strategy is the
following. Ideally we would like to compare two people who are identical, except
that one graduates during a recession and the other one does not. We are effectively
looking for random allocation of recessions at graduation. This is of course impossible,
so we have to resort to comparing people who graduate at different points in time.
We can then choose to compare two groups of people. One, people who might have
started at different points in time, but graduate at the same point in time. In this
case, variation in labor market conditions at graduation arises from differences in
study duration and differences in the moment people enter higher education. Two,
people who start at different points in time, but study for the same amount of
time. Estimates using the first group could be biased, because they might have
14Clustering at the graduation cohort yields similar results.
15In section A.1 in the Appendix I present evidence that students indeed seem to adjust to
labor market conditions. This confirms the need for this IV strategy. I find that graduates from a
university of applied science are more likely to pursue a university degree if conditions are bad when
they obtain their initial degree. University graduates are also more likely to pursue an additional
degree. Finally, graduates from a university of applied science are somewhat older and less likely to
be female if starting conditions are bad.
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adjusted their timing of graduation to labor market conditions. On the other hand,
estimates using the second group only exploits variation in labor market conditions
at graduation due to differences in the year of entry into higher education. OLS
estimation uses both groups to estimate the effects, while my IV strategy effectively
only uses the second group.16
I operationalize the IV strategy as follows. I predict the year of graduation using
the nominal duration of a particular study. In this setting a ‘study’ is defined as
a completed program in a particular field, such as a bachelor’s in engineering or a
master’s in philosophy. If a student takes both a bachelor’s and a master’s, the total
nominal duration of her study is the sum of the nominal duration of the respective
bachelor’s and master’s program. The nominal duration is based on the number
of ECTS required, where one year is equal to 60 ECTS. For many degrees it is 4
years, but for some degrees (e.g. medical or technical academic degrees) the nominal
duration is 6 years. I then use the change in employment in the predicted year of
graduation as an instrument for the change in employment in the actual year of
graduation.
2.2.3 The Dutch higher education system
In my analysis I use data on graduates from the Netherlands. Since the Dutch higher
education system differs somewhat from the US and other countries, I will discuss
the institutional setup in some detail. At the start of secondary education, Dutch
students are tracked in three levels. Only the highest two tracks give direct access
to higher education. Tracking is based on a standardized test taken at the end of
primary school and primary teacher’s evaluations.
The second track (HAVO) takes five years and gives direct access to the
vocationally oriented universities of applied science (hoger beroepsonderwijs, the
literal translation would be “higher vocational education”). These are similar to for
example the Fachhochschule in Germany.17 The highest track in secondary education
16Even if there is no selection in study duration, there could still be selection due to cohort
effects. An illustration of such remaining cohort effects could be the choice of field of study at the
start of the higher education career. Before entering higher education, students choose a field of
study. Their choice might be influenced by the labor market conditions at the moment of choosing
their field. For example, if students make their choice of field during a recession, they might be
more likely to pick a field with more secure or higher labor market returns than during a boom. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail how labor market conditions at the end of
secondary school affect student’s choice for post-secondary education. I include field of study and
cohort fixed effects to take this into account as much as possible.
17Students in the lowest track in secondary education have the opportunity to go to a university
of applied science if they finish their vocational degree (MBO) first. This takes a total of seven or
eight years. I exclude these students from my analysis, so I will not discuss them here.
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(VWO) takes six years and gives direct access to the academically oriented university,
similar to universities in most of Europe.
While both universities and universities of applied science offer tertiary degrees,
there are some important differences between them. First, universities of applied
science have a strong vocational component. They prepare students for so-called
‘professional’ jobs, such as nurses or teachers at the primary or secondary level.
They usually include mandatory internships at firms, often for periods up to half
a year. University, on the other hand, is mostly academic and research-oriented.
University is considered the highest education level in the Netherlands.18 Second,
a study at a university of applied sciences takes four years to complete, while
regular university studies take four to six years, depending on the field of study.
In both cases students immediately choose a field of study when they enroll. In
principle each field is open to each student, although some technical studies require
students to take additional courses in mathematics before they are allowed to enroll.
Some fields of study (e.g. medicine) use a lottery because enrollment is larger than
the number of available places. There is little overlap in the courses between the
different fields, except for some common courses like basic statistics. This means
that students graduating from different fields have acquired very different skill sets.
Third, graduates from a university of applied science finish with a bachelor’s degree,
but most university students finish with a master’s degree.19 While it is possible for
university students to enter the labor market after obtaining their bachelor’s degree,
this rarely happens. Close to 10% of university of applied science graduates continue
to university to obtain a master’s degree, usually after taking a bridge year to catch
up with their academic skills. Around 90% of both university of applied science
graduates and regular university graduates enter the labor market after finishing
their degree.20 Throughout the paper I will use the terms graduates from universities
and academic graduates, and graduates from universities of applied science and
vocational graduates interchangeably.
18The ISCED (2011) code for university bachelor degrees is 64, while the code for university of
applied science bachelor degree is 65. A university master’s degree corresponds to ISCED codes 74.
A master’s degree at a university of applied science has ISCED code 75 (Statistics Netherlands,
2011).
19Universities of applied science have started to offer master degrees in recent years, but these
have low enrollment rates and are generally aimed at people who already have some work experience.
Only 1% of graduates from universities of applied sciences in my sample have a master’s degree.
20These numbers are based on public data from Statistics Netherlands.
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2.2.4 Data sources and sample
I use administrative data from Statistics Netherlands on enrollment and graduation
for all graduates in higher education from 1996 to 2012. The data contain detailed
information on the type of programme followed - field of study and level - and
the exact date of enrollment and graduation. These data can be merged at the
individual level to other datasets using a coded social security number.21 I merge
administrative data on labor market status from 1999 to 2016 obtained from tax
filings of employers. These contain the yearly gross wage and the number of days
worked, which allows me to calculate the gross daily wage, my main dependent
variable. The data also contain information on sector and an employer identifier.
I take the main employer in a year to be the one where a worker earns the most
in a year. I use these to identify when workers switch employer and sector, and to
generate firm-level variables (see section 2.2.6). I obtain demographic characteristics
by merging my data with municipal registries (GBA), which are available from 1995
onwards. These include age and gender. I also add information on social security
claims and whether graduates work as self-employed. I do not have information on
the level of the social security claims or the income earned as self-employed.
To obtain a sample of typical students, I restrict my sample in the following ways.
First, I exclude students who first obtained a vocational (MBO) degree or a foreign
degree before starting their higher education career. Second, I only include bachelor’s,
master’s and equivalent degrees.22 Third, I exclude everyone who graduated before
the age of 20 or after the age of 30. Fourth, I exclude everyone who took shorter
than three years or longer than seven years to obtain their degree. Fifth, I assume
that students have entered the labor market if they have not been enrolled for at
least 400 days after their graduation.23 Finally, I drop workers who at some point
earn less than 20% of the minimum daily wage, earn more than 700 euros a day
21The data are available via a secure connection to Statistics Netherlands for researchers who
sign a confidentiality agreement.
22PhD’s are not observed in the data. The only postgraduate degrees that are observed and
dropped are professional postmaster degrees. These are usually only taken by people with some
work experience. Postgraduate degrees are included when I examine whether economic conditions
at graduation induce workers to obtain a higher degree. These results are reported in the Appendix.
23This assumption is necessary to define labor market entry. If graduates are not working and
not enrolled for an additional degree, I do not observe them in the data. Hence, I assume that they
are looking for a job during this period if it lasts for at least a year. The results do not depend on
the exact length of this period.
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(200,000 a year) or who stop filing taxes at some point because they have moved
abroad.24
2.2.5 Constructing the change in field-specific employment
To construct the change in field-specific employment, I first calculate the share of
workers with a degree from a given field of study and level (university or university of
applied science) in each sector of industry. To this end, I use (the same) administrative
data from tax filings that cover all workers from 1999 to 2016. I select all workers
for whom I observe their highest degree and only keep those workers with a degree
from higher education who are between 30 and 70 years old.25 The remaining sample
contains 11,934,327 worker-year observations. With 18 years of data, this is an
average of 663,018 observations per year. Then I calculate for each year the share
of workers with field of study f in sector of industry s. I use 33 fields of study (17
for universities of applied science and 16 for universities) and 44 sectors of industry.
Fields of study are defined at the 2-digit ISCED97 level, where I combine some
fields of study with a small number of observations.26 Sectors of industry are defined
using the 2-digit NACE Rev. 2. I join sectors where Statistics Netherlands does
not provide official employment statistics or with a small number of graduates.27
I then average the shares over all years to arrive at a time-invariant measure of
the importance of each industry for each field. The change in employment in
each industry is calculated using official statistics from the National Accounts from
Statistics Netherlands covering 1995 - 2016.
Figure 2.1 shows the share of workers in the 10 largest fields of study (5 for
universities of applied science and 5 for universities) working in different aggregated
sectors. For many fields of study, public sectors such as government, health and
education are important areas of employment. For others the private sector is more
important. The figure highlights the variation in my employment decline measure
that stems from time-invariant differences in employment patterns between fields of
24With these restrictions the sample shrinks from 1,000,929 graduates to 515,000 graduates.
The bulk of the selection is due to dropping students with a vocational degree (283,784) and the
subsequent selection on age and study duration (120,083).
25To prevent simultaneity bias, I drop workers younger than 30. The results are similar if I
include all workers.
26For universities of applied sciences I join 42-46, 52 & 54, 62 & 64 and 85 & 86. For universities
I combine 31 & 32, 52 & 54, 62 & 64 and 81 & 84-86. See Table A11 in the Appendix for all fields
of study I use and the corresponding ISCED codes.
27I combine sectors 1-3, 6-9, 10-12, 13-15, 16-18, 19-23, 24-25, 26-27, 29-30, 31-32, 35-39, 50-51,
55-56, 58-60, 62-63, 69-71, 73-77, 80-82, 87-88, 90-92, 94-98.
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study. The other part of the variation in the employment change measure derives
from differences in employment changes between sectors. Figure 2.2 shows the
variation in employment change for 9 aggregated sectors. The variation is largest for
information and communication and business services. It is smallest for the public
sector, which includes health and government.
Figure 2.1: The share of workers in each aggregated sector for the 5 largest fields of
study at each level.
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of graduates in sector
Personal services
Social work
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Business
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University of applied science
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of graduates in sector
Health
Law
Business
Social science
Education
University
Agriculture Manufacturing
Construction Trade, transp, accom
Information and communication Finance
Business services Public
Other
Notes: Sectors are aggregated at the NACE Rev2 main group level. Real estate (L) is combined
with Business services (M-N) because it employs few high educated.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
2.2.6 Constructing other dependent variables
To construct firm-level measures I use the universe of Dutch firms from administrative
linked employer-employee data for 1999 - 2016. For each year I select all workers who
work at a firm on the 1st of October.28 To ensure that I get an accurate picture of
28This is an arbitrary date, the results remain the same if I pick another date
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Figure 2.2: Percentage change in employment for aggregated sectors.
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with Business services (M-N) because it employs few high educated.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
the wages paid by a firm, I drop all workers who worked for less than 90 days at the
firm in a year and all workers who earn less than 20% of the daily minimum wage
or who earn more than 700 euros a day. I drop workers younger than 15 or older
than 75. I also add the same 2-digit industry codes as used before. I calculate the
average real yearly wage at the firm level. This is my main measure of firm quality.
Measures of firm wage rank are constructed as in Haltiwanger et al. (2017). Within
each 2-digit sector and year I calculate employment-weighted quintiles of the average
gross real wage at the firm-level. I then classify high-rank firms as belonging to
quintiles 4 and 5, medium-rank firms as belonging to quintiles 2 and 3 and low-rank
firms as belonging to the first quintile.
To construct a measure of match quality, I use the same data as for constructing
the field-specific employment. To prevent reverse causation, I keep all workers
20
between 30 and 70 years old.29 I then calculate the probability for a worker with a
given degree f to work in a specific 2-digit sector s. Simply using these shares as
an indicator for a match would lead to large sectors being overrepresented as good
matches. Therefore, I normalize the measure by dividing these shares by the average
probability for anyone with a higher education degree to work in sector s:30
M sf =
Ssf∑
f S
s
f
(2.3)
where M is the match quality of field of study f in sector of industry s and S is
the share of workers in s with f . The match quality effectively gives the increase
in probability to work in a s for workers with f compared to all higher educated
workers. I then take the top 5 of sectors for each field of study as sectors where
workers have a good match.31
Finally, switching firm or sectors for workers is defined as having a different firms
or sector in year t compared to year t− 1. All firms are contained within sectors, so
workers can only switch sectors if they also switch firm.
2.2.7 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 gives descriptive statistics for my outcome and control variables. I work
with an unbalanced panel of 3.7 million observations of more than 0.5 million unique
individuals. With 18 cohorts, this amounts to an average of 30,365 individuals per
cohort. 42% of the sample consists of university graduates, and 58% are graduates
from universities of applied science. The average age at graduation is around 23 years
for graduates from universities of applied science and almost 25 years for graduates
from universities. Close to 60% of the sample is female. Since I have a sample of
young workers, job mobility is high. 27% of the person-year observations involve a
person switching firms and around 15% also switch sectors.32 On average, close to
half of vocational graduates and 42% of university graduates are in a good match.
Most graduates are employed. Less than 2% are on benefits, while around 4% are
self-employed.
29I also calculated the same measure using only younger workers between 20 and 35 years. The
results are similar.
30This is similar to the share indicator in Liu et al. (2016).
31In Table A7 in the Appendix I present sensitivity analyses using other cutoffs. The results are
very similar.
32Descriptives on mobility and firm rank for each year since graduation are reported in Tables A12
and A13, respectively.
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There is substantial variation in economic conditions for different fields of study.
Figure 2.3 reports the change in employment over time for the 5 largest fields of study
for both universities of applied science and university. While the cyclical pattern can
be observed for all fields, it is especially pronounced for business, personal services
and law. These are fields that rely for a substantial part on the private sector for
employment. Cyclical variation is much weaker for health and education, which rely
more strongly on the public sector. Table A11 in the Appendix shows descriptives
on the change in employment for each field of study. The strongest variation is found
for technical studies, such as computing and engineering and manufacturing. This
is probably related to the dot-com crisis in the early 2000s, as well as the strong
employment growth of these fields. The weakest variation is observed for education
and health.
Figure 2.4 show the wage-experience profiles for the cohorts in my sample.
Starting wages (the dotted black line) differ quite strongly in line with the business
cycle. However, wages seem to converge in the long run.
Figure 2.3: The change in employment over time for the 5 largest fields of study at
each level.
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Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
2.3 Wage and employment effects of graduating
during a recession
First I consider the effects of the change in employment at graduation on the log
of daily wage. Since I am interested in the effect of graduating during a recession,
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Figure 2.4: Wage-experience profiles for graduates from universities of applied science
and university graduates.
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Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
to ease the interpretation of the results I will use the decline in employment as the
main independent variable rather than the growth. Figure 2.5 plots the estimated
coefficients from the IV specification with the dependent variable specified at the
top.33 Table A8 in the Appendix reports the estimates. The figures report the
effect of a one percentage point decline in employment (around half of a standard
deviation) on the specified outcome variable for the first 8 years after graduation.
All models are separtely estimated for graduates from universities of applied science
and graduates from university. Colored dots are significant at 5%, while white
dots are not. Figure 2.5a shows that, conditional on employment, both vocational
and academic graduates suffer substantial wage losses right after graduation if they
started in a recession compared to their peers. For academic graduates the losses
are close to 10% in the first year for each percentage point decline in field-specific
employment, while the effect is around 6% for vocational graduates. Academic
graduates then slowly catch up to their peers. While the coefficient remains negative
up to 8 years after graduation, the effects are not statistically significantly different
from zero after 6 years of experience. For vocational graduates the catch-up process
is mostly concentrated in the second year after graduation, where the loss declines by
around 50%. After the second year catching up slows down, but the estimated effect
gradually declines to about −1% for each percentage point decline in employment.
The estimated effects for vocational graduates remain significant up to 8 years
33The first stage estimates are repoted in Table A3 in the Appendix. The estimates are highly
significant. They show that for both vocational and academic graduates the change in employment
at graduation is strongly related to the change in employment in the nominal year of graduation.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics.
University of applied science University
(1) (2)
Main independent variables
Change in employment in year of graduation 1.7003 1.6153
(1.8609) (1.7235)
Change in employment in nominal year of graduation 1.7955 1.9403
(1.8863) (1.7473)
Main outcome variables
ln(daily wage) 4.6982 4.8326
(0.3975) (0.4627)
Employed 0.9487 0.9410
(0.2206) (0.2356)
Self-employed 0.0402 0.0382
(0.1965) (0.1916)
On benefits 0.0199 0.0184
(0.1396) (0.1344)
Switch firm 0.2676 0.2891
(0.4427) (0.4533)
Switch 1-digit sector 0.1436 0.1601
(0.3507) (0.3667)
Switch 2-digit sector 0.1597 0.1743
(0.3663) (0.3794)
ln(average firm wage) 10.2659 10.4019
(0.4031) (0.4170)
Good match 0.4891 0.4203
(0.4999) (0.4936)
Control variables
Female 0.5996 0.5691
(0.4900) (0.4952)
Age at graduation 23.2815 24.6928
(1.7123) (1.6922)
Observations 2,179,304 1,559,875
Number of individuals 298,946 216,054
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
after graduation. The differences between vocational and academic graduates are
significant for the first four years. However, for later years I can not reject the null
hypothesis that the effects are equal.
These findings are generally robust to specification changes. Table A4 reports
estimates using the national change in employment. The national estimates are
smaller for both vocational and academic graduates, indicating that graduates
respond much more strongly to conditions in labor markets where their studies
prepared them for than to overall conditions. This could also explain why these
estimates for academic graduates, although large, are not statistically significant.
The same table also reports estimates using the sector-specific change in added value
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rather than employment as an input to my measure for economic conditions. The
estimates are smaller than when using employment. This is expected, because there
is generally some time lag between a loss in output and a reduction in employment.
Nevertheless, the estimates are qualitatively in line with the main results. Table A5
reports OLS estimates. The estimates are smaller than the IV estimates, but the
pattern is very comparable.34
One might also wonder whether the estimated effects are indeed linear as the
specification used in this paper and in the literature assumes. Figure A1 in the
Appendix reports marginal effects of a quadratic specification of the change in
employment at graduation. The initial effects are larger for both academic and
vocational graduates, but particularly for academic graduates. Nevertheless, the
overall pattern remains the same. In fact, the catch-up seems to happen somewhat
quicker for both groups when using this specification. Figure A2 compares the
effects for graduates going into a downturn and graduates going into an upturn. A
downturn is defined as a year-on-year increase in the (national) unemployment rate.
This shows that the effects of a decline in employment also occur when going into an
upturn, but that they are much stronger when going into a downturn. In particular
again academic graduates suffer much stronger initial effects and their catch-up is
slower than average. Finally, I also consider whether the effects differ across the two
recessions - the Great Recession starting in 2008 and the dot-com crisis in the early
2000s - in my sample. These estimates show that, again, the initial effects are much
stronger for those graduating in the stronger recession from 2008 onwards. Note
that the estimates for the later years since graduation should be interpreted with
caution, because I can only follow the 2007 and 2008 cohorts for the full 8 years.
Labor market conditions at graduation might also affect labor supply decisions.
And if lower-skilled workers are more likely to quit looking for a job in a recession, I
might underestimate the effect of the unemployment rate at graduation on wages.
It is therefore instructive to also consider effects on employment and other labor
market outcomes.
Figure 2.5b reports results for employment. For both vocational and academic
graduates I find small declines in employment probabilities right after graduation.
34Table A6 reports further robustness checks. First, it presents estimates from the main
specification but restricted to students who did not switch from their initial track assigned to them
at the end of primary school. The results are very similar to the main results. This alleviates
some concerns about students selecting themselves in the academic or vocational track. Second, it
presents estimates only including workers who report positive earnings in each year since graduation.
The estimates are again very similar, indicating that there is no selective dropping out of the labor
market due to bad starting conditions.
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Figure 2.5: Estimated effects of the decline in field-specific employment on wage and
employment status.
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(c) Self-employment
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Notes: The figure reports estimates of the effect of the decline in field-specific employment on
ln(daily wage), a dummy for employment, a dummy for self-employment and a dummy for being
on benefits at different years since graduation. Coefficients are obtained from IV estimates of
equation 2.2 where the decline in field-specific employment at graduation is instrumented with
the decline in field-specific employment at the nominal moment of graduation. Colored dots are
statistically significant at at least 5% and white dots are not. Parameter estimates are reported in
Table A8 in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
After about 3 to 4 years on the labor market however, the effects disappear. For each
percentage point decline in employment, the probability to be employed declines by
about 0.5% for academic graduates and by 0.2% for vocational graduates. The effects
do not differ significantly however. For university graduates I find small positive
effects in later years.
If it is difficult to find a job, graduates might substitute regular employment with
self-employment. In addition, for some fields of study, such as arts, self-employment is
very common. On the other hand, graduates might be more inclined to take the risk
of becoming self-employed in good economic conditions (Beiler, 2017). Figure 2.5c
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shows the estimates on the probability to be self-employed. I find that the probability
to be self-employed increases in the first few years after graduation in bad economic
conditions for university graduates. These results are in contrast to Beiler (2017),
who finds for Germany that the probability to be self-employed declines for recent
graduates in bad economic conditions. This suggests that in the Netherlands self-
employment acts as a substitute for regular employment when it is more difficult to
find a job. I find negative effects for university graduates in later years. Together
with the estimates for employment, this suggests that they switch from employment
to self-employment. For vocational graduates I find no effect of economic conditions
on self-employment.
Finally, I examine whether graduates are more likely to be on benefits. This
includes unemployment benefits, welfare and disability benefits. Figure 2.5d reports
the results. I find only an effect for the first year after graduation, and it is a small
negative estimate. Overall, graduates do not seem to rely on benefits to supplement
lost labor income.
In all, the results suggest that vocational graduates have an easier transition
to the labor market in bad economic conditions than academic graduates. Both
their wage and employment losses compared to their peers are smaller than for
academic graduates. This confirms the hypothesis that vocational education eases
the transition to the labor market in a recession. Academic graduates ultimately
catch up to those who graduated in good times in about five years. For vocational
graduates, on the other hand, I find persistent wage losses at about −1% for at least
the first 8 years of their career. I also find evidence that the effects of graduating in
a recession are not linear. In particular for academic graduates I find that the initial
effects are much stronger in a downturn and for those who graduated in the Great
Recession compared to earlier cohorts. I will now turn to the mechanisms driving
the recovery process.
2.4 Mechanisms of recovery
Young workers can recover from initial wage losses due to bad starting conditions
both within firms and between firms. Within firms human capital theory helps
to explain the recovery process. Building firm and sector-specific human capital
increases productivity and will lead to wage increases. If learning is concave, workers
who start in worse positions will eventually catch up with those who started in better
positions. An alternative model to explain both the initial losses and the subsequent
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recovery is long-term wage contracting. In this model workers and firms agree on a
contract wage when an employment relationship starts. If labor market conditions
are bad during the start, the contracted wage will be lower. If conditions improve
and workers are mobile, the firm has to renegotiate the wage to keep the worker
from moving (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). Both
models imply that workers who start in a recession will primarily improve their wage
within the firm, not by moving to another firm. The human capital view explains
this through building firm-specific human capital.35 The long-term contracting view
relies on renegotiated contract wages.
Catch up between firms occurs through job mobility. It is a costly process of
finding the right job. This can be explained by search theory, in particular by
models that feature on the job search. As already highlighted by Topel and Ward
(1992), frequent job switching is an integral part of most early careers. Through job
shopping, young workers search for a good match and they experience wage gains.
Indeed, wage gains in early careers are for a substantial part explained by labor
market frictions (Topel and Ward, 1992; Van der Klaauw and van Vuuren, 2010).
When graduates enter the labor market in a recession, there are fewer vacancies.
Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that the quality of vacancies is lower
(McLaughlin and Bils, 2001; Martins et al., 2012; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2016;
Haltiwanger et al., 2017). This suggests that workers are less likely to find a good
match when they start in a recession. This is confirmed by recent evidence that
young workers who start in a recession are more likely to be mismatched (Liu et al.,
2016; Altonji et al., 2016).
A useful model to think about this process is a job ladder model. The idea of
this type of model is that firms are ranked in terms of the wages they pay. High-
paying firms, who pay more because they are more productive, are high up the job
ladder, whereas low-paying firms who are less productive are low-ranked. Workers
search for a job both while unemployed and on the job. Workers only accept an
offer if it is better than their current offer, and hence, through on the job search,
workers move up the job ladder to high-paying firms. More productive firms grow by
poaching workers from low-paying firms, while low-paying firms more often hire from
unemployment. During recessions, the process of moving up the job ladder slows
35Of course, if the initial sector or firm is a particularly bad match, it will be helpful to switch
to a better matched sector or firm. Otherwise, workers might be stuck in a bad match because
they start developing specific human capital for the tasks in that match (Gibbons and Waldman,
2004, 2006). Nevertheless, the theory predicts that workers will only start catching up once they
start developing their human capital.
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down (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2016). High-paying firms, who
were less restricted in hiring during the previous boom because they could poach
from low-paying firms, now have more employment to shed than low-paying firms.
Furthermore, due to high unemployment in a recession, all firms find it easier to fill
vacancies. This primarily affects low-paying firms however, since they more often
hire from unemployment. Low-paying firms will therefore hire more during recessions
than high-paying firms. This also means that the probability of moving up the job
ladder declines (Haltiwanger et al., 2017).
Recovery through productive on the job search implies that workers who start
during a recession will be more likely to switch firms and sectors until they catch
up. In addition, the dynamic job ladder model implies that workers are more likely
to start at low-paying firms. Finally, if primarily high-paying firms sharply reduce
hiring, the probability of an initial mismatch for high educated workers could also
increase.36 I will examine these mechanisms in this section.
2.4.1 Firm and sector mobility
I first consider the quality of firms workers who graduated in a recession start at. I
use the log real mean yearly wage of a firm as the main indicator for firm quality.
This is a simple measure of “firm quality”. Higher paying firms are thought to be of
higher quality, and could be a better match, especially for high-educated graduates.37
Figure 2.6a shows that both vocational and academic graduates tend to start at
lower-paying firms if they graduated in a recession. For academic graduates I find
that for every percentage point decline in employment at graduation, the average
wage paid by the firm is 5% lower compared to their peers. The effects are somewhat
smaller for vocational graduates at about 3.5%. However, these effects are not
significantly different from each other. Both academic and vocational graduates
recover, until there are no significant differences anymore at the fourth or fifth year
after graduation.
The steady increase in firm quality already suggests that job mobility increases.
Figures 2.6b to 2.6d confirm this. They show estimates of the effect of the decline
in employment at graduation on the probability to switch firm, 1-digit and 2-digit
sector. The estimates show that for both graduates from universities and universities
36This is not necessarily implied by the model since it does not feature worker and job
heterogeneity.
37Results are very similar if instead of the mean wage I use a wage measure adjusted for firm-level
characteristics.
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of applied science job mobility increases in the first 5 years if they started in a bad
labor market. The estimates suggest that the effects are somewhat stronger for
graduates from university, who also suffered stronger wage losses, but they are not
significantly different from each other. After about five years on the labor market,
firm and sector mobility is similar to those who graduated in a boom. This is also
the point when most of the wage losses have been recoverd. For graduates from
universities of applied science the estimates for sector mobility remain significant up
to 7 years after graduation.38
These findings are in line with earlier findings on the more flexible labor market
in Canada (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). Job mobility, and hence on the job search,
plays an important role in recovery from a bad starting position for both academic
and vocational graduates.39
2.4.2 Match quality and the job ladder
I will now consider the effects of the decline in employment at graduation on match
quality and firm rank (as defined in section 2.2.6). Figure 2.7 reports the estimation
results. Figure 2.7a presents the effect on match quality. I find that for both academic
and vocational graduates the match quality is lower if they started in a recession.
For academic graduates match quality quickly improves, and the effects are no longer
significant after year 3. For vocational graduates, however, match quality remains
consistently lower than for those who started in good times.40 Figures 2.7b to 2.7d
show the effect of the decline in employment at graduation on the probability of
38Some of the estimates for switching sector are larger than for switching firms, while firms are
contained within a sector. The reason is that these estimates present the effect on the probability
of switching relative to workers with the same degree who started in better times. They appear just
as likely to switch firms as those who started in bad times after a few years on the labor market,
but are less likely to switch sectors.
39Earlier literature on job mobility for vocational and general educated workers focuses mostly
on graduates from apprenticeships in German-speaking countries or secondary vocational education
(e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998; Korpi and Mertens, 2003; Von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Göggel
and Zwick, 2012; Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012; Fitzenberger et al., 2015). This literature often
finds negative wage returns to job switching after finishing apprenticeships, although some studies
find no effects or small positive effects. However, for apprenticeships the losses are likely driven
by the loss of firm-specific human capital. Korpi and Mertens (2003) show that the probability
to switch jobs is lower for those with more general secondary education than for those from an
apprenticeship, but they find no differences in firm and industry mobility. There is as far as I’m
aware no evidence on differences in job mobility for tertiary vocational and academic graduates.
40Table A7 reports robustness checks using other cutoffs for the match quality indicator or other
match quality measures. The results are generally very robust. I find that in each case vocational
graduates are more likely to remain mismatched, while for academic graduates the mismatch is
recoverd after 3 to 5 years on the labor market.
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Figure 2.6: Estimated effects of the decline in field-specific employment on mean
firm wage and job mobility.
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Notes: The figure reports estimates of the effect of the decline in field-specific employment on
ln(mean firm wage), a dummy for switching firm, a dummy for 1-digit sector switch and a dummy
for switching 2-digit sector at different years since graduation. Coefficients are obtained from
IV estimates of equation 2.2 where the decline in field-specific employment at graduation is
instrumented with the decline in field-specific employment at the nominal moment of graduation.
Colored dots are statistically significant at at least 5% and white dots are not. Parameter estimates
are reported in Table A9 in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
working in a low-, medium- or high-ranked firm. Consistent with the previous results,
I find that the probability to work in a low or medium ranked firm increases if
workers started in bad conditions, while the probability to work in a high-ranked
firm declines. This is in line with the dynamic job ladder model, which predicts
that lower-ranked firms are more likely to hire in recessions. Through job mobility,
graduates eventually recover and climb the job ladder. Nevertheless, they remain
more likely to work in medium-ranked firms and vocational graduates are significantly
more likely than their peers to get stuck in low-ranked firms. This could at least
partly explain the persisitently significant wage losses for vocational graduates.
31
Figure 2.7: Estimated effects of the decline in field-specific employment on match
quality and firm rank.
(a) Match quality
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(c) Medium-ranked firm
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(d) High-ranked firm
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Notes: The figure reports estimates of the effect of the decline in field-specific employment on a
dummy for being mismatched and dummies for working in a low-, medium- and high-ranked firm
at different years since graduation. Coefficients are obtained from IV estimates of equation 2.2
where the decline in field-specific employment at graduation is instrumented with the decline in
field-specific employment at the nominal moment of graduation. Colored dots are statistically
significant at at least 5% and white dots are not. Parameter estimates are reported in Table A10
in the Appendix.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
2.4.3 Returns to job mobility
Up until this point the evidence on recovery via job mobility has been indirect. I will
now consider some direct evidence by looking at the wage returns to job mobility.
To estimate the returns, I augment my baseline model with a dummy variable for
mover status (Mover) and interact it with the change in employment at graduation
(ecf). The dependent variable is the change in log daily wage (∆ln(wage)it, defined
as ln(wage)it − ln(wage)it−1):
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∆ln(wage)it = α + βexpexpit ∗ ecf + γ1Mover + γ2Mover ∗ ecf + ηi + τt + εit,
(2.4)
whereMover is 1 if a worker switches firm (or sector) and 0 otherwise. Obviously,
job mobility is endogenous. Workers who move are probably those who benefit
from making a move. Therefore, these estimates are likely an upper bound of the
actual effect of switching firms or sectors. To deal with the bias from endogenous
job mobility as best as possible, I include individual fixed effects ηi to control for
time-invariant individual factors (Von Wachter and Bender, 2006; Del Bono and Vuri,
2011). The other variables are defined as before.41 Parameter γ1 gives an estimate
of the effect of moving to another job on changes in log daily wage and γ2 gives the
differential effect of changing jobs due to the change in employment at graduation.
If those who graduate during a recession have higher returns to job mobility than
those who graduate during a boom, I would expect a positive estimate for γ2.
Table 2.2 reports the estimation results. First consider the estimates for vocational
graduates in columns (1) to (3). Column (1) shows that if vocational graduates
switch firm, they gain almost 2.5 log points in wage. Those who started in a recession
gain around 0.8 log point per percentage point decline in employment at graduation.
The gains when switching sector are higher at close to 4 log points (columns 2 and
3). These likely reflect the gain from switching to a better matched sector. The
gains for those graduating in a recession are also larger at around 1 log point per
percentage point declinie in employment at graduation. Now consider the results
for academic graduates. Column (4) shows that academic graduates gain almost 5
log points when they switch firm. The gains from switching sector are also larger
than for vocational graduates, at around 6.5 log points. The differences between
vocational and academic graduates are highly significant. However, the gains for
those who started in a recession are similar for academic and vocational graduates,
at about 1 log point per percentage point decline in employment at graduation.
Taken together, these results suggest that job mobility plays a critical role in
recovering from initial wage losses for both academic and vocational graduates who
start in a recession. They are both more likely to switch firms and sectors, and when
they do switch, they gain more than their counterparts who started in a boom. The
results are in line with a model that emphasizes search on the job as a mechanism
of wage gains. Consistent with the dynamic job ladder model, graduates are more
likely to start in low-ranked firms in a recession and gradually move to higher ranked
41The cohort and field of study fixed effects drop out due to the individual fixed effects.
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firms. Interestingly, while switching sectors solves the initial mismatch for academic
graduates, vocational graduates remain in sectors that are not typical for their field
of study. This could at least partly explain the persistent wage losses for vocational
graduates.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper I examined the early career effects of graduating in a recession for
vocational and academic graduates from Dutch higher education. I used cohorts from
1996 to 2012 and followed them on the labor market from 1999 to 2016. Exploiting
field-specific differences in the change in employment at graduation, I find that
academic graduates suffer an initial 10% lower wage per percentage point decline in
employment at graduation. The effects gradually decline and fade out after about
five years on the labor market. The initial wage losses for vocational graduates are
significantly smaller at close to 6% for each percentage point decline in field-specific
employment at graduation. However, they remain persistent at around −1% up until
8 years after graduation.
The main mechanism driving the initial losses is that graduates start working
at employers who pay less and are lower on the job ladder. Through upwards job
mobility they catch up to those who graduated in good times. Both groups of
graduates are more likely to switch firms and sectors, and when they do switch,
they gain more than their counterparts who started in a boom. Academic graduates
gain significantly more when switching than vocational graduates. Both are also
more likely to be mismatched in their early career. While for academic graduates
switching sectors solves the initial mismatch, vocational graduates remain in sectors
that are not typical for their field of study. This could at least partly explain the
persistent wage losses for vocational graduates. To conclude, the transition from
education to the labor market in a recession is easier for vocational graduates, but
academic graduates ultimately catch up quicker to their peers who started in better
times than vocational graduates.
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A Appendix
A.1 Selection bias
The main analyses use an instrument to take into account that students might
postpone graduation in a bad labor market. One way in which students might select
themselves onto the labor market is in their choice of obtaining a higher or additional
degree. Students who graduate during a recession might face lower opportunity costs
of staying in school and thus are more likely to obtain an additional degree. Table A1
shows the estimated relation between the change in field-specific employment at
graduation (the first level mentioned in each column) and the probability to obtain an
additional degree (the second level mentioned). I estimate a simple linear probability
model that relates a dummy variable indicating whether a student pursued an
additional degree to the change in field-specific employment measured at graduation
of the first level and the same set of control variables as included in the other
specifications. Note that students with a degree from a university of applied science
can pursue a bachelor’s or master’s degree at the their own level, or a bachelor’s or
master’s degree at the university level. University students can pursue an (additional)
master’s degree at the university level. I find that both graduates from universities
of applied science and graduates from universities are more likely to pursue a degree
at the university level if employment in their field declined at graduation.
Table A2 provides further evidence of selection. It reports the effect of the
decline in employment at graduation on the composition of the graduation cohorts.
Columns (1) and (5) report the effect on the share of women. I find that cohorts
from universities of applied science are less likely to be female when field-specific
employment is higher. Columns (2) and (6) report the average age. I find no
significant effect. Columns (3) and (7) report effects on the share of graduates 28 or
older. This indeed increases for cohorts in universities of applied science. Finally, I
find no effect on the share of workers 24 or younger.
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Table A3: First stage estimates for IV estimates.
University of applied science University
First stage estimate F-statistic First stage estimate F-statistic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect at year of potential
experience
1 0.6699∗∗∗ 570.39 0.4179∗∗∗ 173.56
(0.0285) (0.0280)
2 0.7051∗∗∗ 368.27 0.4786∗∗∗ 177.86
(0.0284) (0.0308)
3 0.7281∗∗∗ 534.17 0.5256∗∗∗ 184.04
(0.0266) (0.0313)
4 0.7566∗∗∗ 422.37 0.5559∗∗∗ 182.85
(0.2780) (0.0311)
5 0.7579∗∗∗ 683.23 0.5571∗∗∗ 193.48
(0.0278) (0.0313)
6 0.7525∗∗∗ 715.86 0.5399∗∗∗ 246.29
(0.0293) (0.0335)
7 0.7639∗∗∗ 716.85 0.5332∗∗∗ 205.98
(0.0298) (0.0360)
8 0.7388∗∗∗ 481.58 0.4975∗∗∗ 179.28
(0.0334) (0.0370)
N 2,067,535 1,467,864
Notes: The first stage regressions include fixed effects for potential experience, calendar year, field of
study and graduation year. Demographic controls are age at graduation and gender. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered at the level of graduation cohort and field of study. Significance levels: ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
A.2 Other rubustness checks
Figure A1: Marginal effects of the decline in field-specific employment on ln(daily
wage) using a quadratic specification for the decline in field-specific employment.
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Notes: The figure reports marginal effects of the effect of the decline in field-specific employment on
ln(daily wage) using a quadratic specification for the decline in field-specific employment. Marginal
effects are obtained from IV estimates of equation 2.2 where the decline in field-specific employment
at graduation is instrumented with the decline in field-specific employment at the nominal moment
of graduation. Colored dots are statistically significant at at least 5% and white dots are not.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
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Figure A2: Estimated effects of the decline in field-specific employment on ln(daily
wage) for workers graduating in a downturn or an upturn and graduating in the
Great Recession or before.
(a) Upturn
−
.
2
−
.
15
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
Pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Years since graduation
University of applied science University
(b) Downturn
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(c) Graduated 1996 - 2006
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(d) Graduated 2007 - 2012
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Notes: The figure reports estimates of the effect of the decline in field-specific employment on
ln(daily wage). Coefficients are obtained from IV estimates of equation 2.2 where the decline in
field-specific employment at graduation is instrumented with the decline in field-specific employment
at the nominal moment of graduation. Colored dots are statistically significant at at least 5% and
white dots are not.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
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2. Bad Start, Bad Match? The Early Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession
for Vocational and Academic Graduates
Table A4: IV estimates of the effect of two different indicators for economic conditions
at graduation on ln(daily wage). The first measure uses the national change in
employment. The second uses the sector-specific change in added value as input in
calculating field-specific economic conditions.
University of applied science University
National
change in
employment
Added value
instead of
employment
National
change in
employment
Added value
instead of
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect at years since
graduation
1 −0.0344∗∗∗ −0.0214∗∗∗ −0.0421 −0.0309∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0068) (0.0298) (0.0136)
2 −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0234 −0.0218∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0147) (0.0084)
3 −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0185 −0.0186∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0132) (0.0071)
4 −0.0013 −0.0120∗∗∗ −0.0103 −0.0143∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0086) (0.0057)
5 −0.0024 −0.0141∗∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0098∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0041) (0.0047)
6 −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0170∗∗∗ 0.0047 −0.0086∗
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0041) (0.0044)
7 −0.0062∗∗∗ −0.0193∗∗∗ 0.0043 −0.0102∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0049) (0.0042)
8 −0.0052∗ −0.0212∗∗∗ 0.0045 −0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0043)
N 2,067,535 2,067,535 1,467,864 1,467,864
Notes: The table reports the effect of the percentage decline in employment (or added value) at
graduation on ln(daily wage). Columns (1) and (3) use the national change in employment rather
than the field-specific change. Columns (2) and (4) use the sector-specific change in added value (in
real 2010 prices) as input for calculating the economic conditions measure rather than the change in
employment. Coefficients obtained from IV regressions where the percentage decline in employment
(or added value) at graduation is instrumented with the percentage decline in employment (or added
value) in the nominal year of graduation. Regressions include fixed effects for potential experience,
calendar year, field of study and graduation year. Demographic controls are age at graduation
and gender. They are separately estimated for graduates from universities of applied science and
university. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the level of graduation cohort and field
of study. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Netherlands.
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Table A5: OLS estimates of the effect of the field-specific decline in employment on
ln(daily wage).
University of applied science University
(1) (2)
Effect at years since
graduation
1 −0.0388∗∗∗ −0.0378∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0067)
2 −0.0207∗∗∗ −0.0299∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0037)
3 −0.0159∗∗∗ −0.0223∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0031)
4 −0.0120∗∗∗ −0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0026)
5 −0.0095∗∗∗ −0.0061∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0026)
6 −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0031
(0.0023) (0.0029)
7 −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0033)
8 −0.0081∗∗ −0.0020
(0.0033) (0.0036)
N 2,067,535 1,467,864
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the effect of the percentage
decline in employment at graduation on ln(daily wage). Regressions include
fixed effects for potential experience, calendar year, field of study and
graduation year. Demographic controls are age at graduation and gender.
They are separately estimated for graduates from universities of applied
science and university. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the
level of graduation cohort and field of study. Significance levels: ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Source: Own calculations based on registration data from Statistics Nether-
lands.
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A.4 Descriptives on each field of study
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A.5 Descriptives on firm rank, job mobility and match
quality
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CHAPTER 3
Summary and Conclusions
Chapter 2. Automatic reaction: what happens to workers at firms that
automate?
Chapter 2 considers the impact of automation within the firm on workers’ outcomes.
We use data on 36,085 Dutch firms employing close to five million workers on average
per year in the period 2000–2016. We compare workers at firms that automate with
workers at firms that automate later. Our analysis shows that automation at the
firm increases the probability to separate from the firm by around 24% for incumbent
workers (those who have been at the firm for at least three years). For them, firm
separation is followed by an increase in time spent in unemployment. Due to the
increased incidence of unemployment, workers experience on average a decline in
cumulative wage income of around 8% of yearly earnings after five years. Wage rates
however, do not appear to be affected. We also find that earnings losses are larger
for older workers and are only partially offset by benefits. While the probability to
separate from the firm also increases for those recently hired by the firm (one or two
years before the automation event), these workers experience no decline in income.
Chapter 3. Bad start, bad match? The early career effects of
graduating in a recession for vocational and academic graduates
Chapter 3 estimates the effect of graduating in a recession for high-educated workers
in the Netherlands. Using data on all Dutch graduates between 1996 and 2012, I
find that academic graduates suffer initial wage losses of 10% for each percentage
point decline (around half of a standard deviation) in field-specific employment at
graduation. The wage losses fade out after five years on the labor market. The wage
losses for vocational graduates are smaller at 6% for each percentage point decline in
field-specific employment at graduation. However, they remain persistent at 1% up
to at least 8 years after graduation. Employment probabilities for both groups are
negatively affected in the first four years on the labor market. Job mobility plays
a critical role in recovering from initial wage losses. Both groups are more likely
to switch firms and sectors, and when they do switch, they gain more than their
counterparts who started in a boom. Switching also resolves sectoral mismatch for
academic, but not for vocational graduates.
Chapter 4. Do parents work more when children start school? Evidence
from the Netherlands
Chapter 4 examines how parents adjust their working hours when their youngest
child goes to school. We show theoretically that there are two effects. First, parents
who used to take care of their children during school hours have an increase in
time available and are hence expected to increase their working hours. Second,
parents whose children attended paid childcare before going to school might decrease
their working hours, because they spend less on childcare expenses. Using data on
all Dutch parents between 2006 and 2016, we show significant differences in the
responses between fathers and mothers. Dutch mothers on average experience an
increase in their free time of 13 hours a week when their youngest child goes to
school, yet the average number of hours worked per week increases by 0.5 hours after
two years. Dutch fathers, who usually already worked full-time, also show a small
increase in hours worked of about 0.3 hours.
Chapter 5. Using tax deductions to promote lifelong learning: real and
shifting responses
Finally, chapter 5 considers whether a tax deduction stimulates investment in lifelong
learning. Workers are allowed to deduct expenses for lifelong learning at their
marginal tax rate. We exploit two jumps in the marginal tax rate in a regression
kink design to estimate the effect of the deduction. These jumps create exogenous
variation in the effective costs of lifelong learning for people with very similar income
levels. We apply this method to data on the universe of Dutch tax payers between
2006 and 2012. For singles we find heterogeneous effects. For low-income singles we
find no effect of the lower costs of lifelong learning due to the jump in the marginal
tax rate. However, for high-income singles we find a 10% increase in the probability
to file lifelong learning expenditures. We find that these effects are primarily driven
by higher-educated middle-aged males. For couples we find small effects for primary
earners and no effects for secondary earners.
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary)
Schokken op de arbeidsmarkt kunnen van grote invloed zijn op het leven en de
carrières van mensen. Bij een schok kun je bijvoorbeeld denken aan een fabriek
die moet sluiten in het midden van een recessie. Mensen verliezen hierdoor, buiten
hun eigen schuld om. Desalniettemin kunnen de gevolgen groot zijn. Hoewel veel
mensen relatief snel weer nieuw werk vinden, kan het voor sommigen het begin zijn
van een lange periode van werkloosheid, een langdurig lager inkomen (Jacobson
et al., 1993) en slechtere gezondheid (Rege et al., 2009). Onderzoek laat zelfs zien
dat werknemers die te maken hebben met onvrijwillig baanverlies gemiddeld eerder
overlijden (Sullivan and von Wachter, 2009). Ook doen hun kinderen het slechter in
school (Rege et al., 2011).
Schokken op de arbeidsmarkt kunnen veel verschillende oorzaken hebben. Een
belangrijke oorzaak is de conjunctuur, zoals bij het hierboven genoemde voorbeeld.
Maar ook instuties en veranderingen in beleid kunnen leiden tot schokken. Structurele
veranderingen, zoals globalisering en de introductie van nieuwe technologie in het
productieproces kunnen ook van grote invloed zijn op het werk van mensen. De
eerste drie hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift onderzoeken hoe drie verschillende type
schokken invloed hebben op de arbeidsparticipatie, het inkomen en het gebruik
van sociale zekerheid van mensen. De hoofdstukken gaan respectievelijk over
schokken veroorzaakt door automatisering, de conjunctuur en door instituties. Er
zijn verschillende beleidsreacties mogelijk op dit soort schokken. Vaak bestaat de
reactie uit een compensatie voor de werknemers die geraakt worden, zoals via een
werkloosheidsuitkering. Dit is echter slechts een tijdelijk antwoord om het directe
inkomensverlies op te vangen. Mensen die hun baan verliezen doordat bijvoorbeeld
een robot hun werk heeft overgenomen, hebben vaak nieuwe vaardigheden nodig
om nieuw werk te vinden. Een veel gehoorde maatregel is dan om te investeren in
training. Het is echter nog niet duidelijk hoe dit soort beleid het beste vorm gegeven
kan worden. In hoofdstuk 5 onderzoeken we of een fiscale aftrekpost effectief is bij
het stimuleren van training.
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In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we de impact van automatisering binnen een
bedrijf op de uitkomsten van werknemers bij dat bedrijf. We gebruiken data over
36.085 Nederlandse bedrijven met bijna vijf miljoen werknemers per jaar voor de
periode 2000–2016. We vergelijken werknemers bij bedrijven die automatiseren
met werknemers bij bedrijven die later automatiseren. Onze analyse laat zien dat
automatisering binnen een bedrijf ertoe leidt dat werknemers die al minimaal drie
jaar bij het bedrijf werken voordat het gaat automatiseren een hogere kans hebben
om te vertrekken bij het bedrijf na automatisering. Na vertrek worden ze vaker
werkloos. Ze verliezen cumulatief ongeveer 11% van een jaarinkomen na vijf jaar
door automatisering. We vinden geen effecten op het loon voor deze werknemers
als ze werk hebben. Het inkomensverlies komt dus puur doordat ze vaker werkloos
zijn dan werknemers die niet met automatisering te maken hebben. De sociale
zekerheid compenseert maar een deel van het inkomensverlies. We laten ook zien dat
grote investeringen in computers niet tot dit soort negatieve gevolgen leiden voor
werknemers.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de gevolgen van afstuderen tijdens een recessie voor
mensen die een hbo- of wo-opleiding hebben afgerond. Ik gebruik data over alle
afgestudeerden tussen 1996 en 2012. Zowel hbo- als wo-opgeleiden die in een recessie
starten verdienen initieel minder dan hun leeftijdgenoten die op een beter moment
starten. Voor wo-opgeleiden is het initiële loon 10% lager per procentpunt afname in
de werkgelegenheid in hun studierichting (ongeveer een halve standaardafwijking).
Na vijf jaar halen ze het verlies in. Voor hbo opgeleiden is het initiële verlies met 6%
kleiner, maar ook na 8 jaar verdienen zij nog 1% minder per procentpunt afname in
de werkgelegenheid in hun studierichting dan mensen die in een hoogconjunctuur
zijn gestart. De kans op werk is voor beide groepen lager in de eerste vier jaar na
afstuderen. Ze halen het verlies in door vaker te wisselen van baan en sector. En
als ze wisselen, maken ze ook grotere loonstappen dan hun leeftijdgenoten die op
een beter moment zijn gestart. Hbo afgestudeerden blijven echter ook na 8 jaar nog
vaker in een mismatch.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we hoe ouders hun gewerkte uren aanpassen als hun
jongste kind naar school gaan. Theoretisch zijn er twee effecten te verwachten van
deze verandering. Ten eerste, voor ouders die zelf voor hun kind zorgden tijdens
schooluren komt er meer tijd beschikbaar. Dit kan leiden tot een toename in hun
gewerkte uren. Ten tweede, ouders die gebruik maakten van betaalde kinderopvang
hoeven daar nu minder aan uit te geven, en gaan daardoor mogelijk minder werken.
We gebruiken gegevens over alle ouders tussen 2006 en 2016. Moeders gaan gemiddeld
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0,5 uur per week extra werken als hun jongste kind naar school gaat, hoewel zij
tegelijkertijd gemiddeld 13 uur per week minder tijd kwijt zijn aan het zorgen voor
hun kind. Vaders laten een kleinere toename zien van ongeveer 0,3 uur per week.
Zij werkten echter ook al vaker voltijds voor hun kind naar school gaat.
Tenslotte bekijken we in hoofdstuk 5 of een fiscale aftrekpost ertoe leidt dat
werkenden meer investeren in scholing. Werkenden, zowel zzp’ers als werknemers,
mogen hun kosten voor scholing aftrekken tegen hun marginale belastingtarief.
Het marginale belastingtarief kent twee discrete sprongen. Hierdoor verschillen de
effectieve kosten voor scholing voor mensen die net onder en net boven deze grenzen
verdienen. We gebruiken een zogenaamd regression kink design om deze mensen te
vergelijken. Voor onze analyse gebruiken we data over alle belastingbetalers tussen
2006 en 2012. Voor alleenstanden vinden we heterogene effecten. Alleenstaanden met
een laag inkomen reageren niet op de lagere kosten voor scholing. Alleenstaanden
met een hoog inkomen laten echter een 10% toename zien in de kans dat ze
scholingsuitgaven aftrekken. Deze extra uitgaven worden vooral gedaan door hoger
opgeleide mannen van middelbare leeftijd. Binnen stellen vinden we kleine positieve
effecten voor de meestverdiener en geen effect voor de minstverdiener.
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